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Law and the Future:

Trade Regulation
By Aaron Director* and Edward H. Levi**

TN

this note we do not attempt to predict the future of the antitrust laws. Rather we wish to direct attention to certain prob-

lem areas for study. We assume for the purposes of this discussion
that an over-riding belief in both free enterprise and in competition
will prevail over future possible NRA attempts. We assume also
that despite the extension of government regulation of one form
or another, there will still be a place for regulation by competition.
The ability of the antitrust laws in weathering NRA and government regulation attempts in the past provides a basis for assuming
the laws will continue. The durability of the antitrust laws is
perhaps their main characteristic. In large measure, this is a
common law durability, built on a case by case development, and
exhibiting that flexibility which is the strength of the common law.
But this flexibility is now limited by particularizing legislation
enacted to accompany the Sherman Act. Throughout its history,
indeed, the Sherman Act has exhibited the twin tendencies of
flexibility and ambiguity, on the one hand, and a drive for certainty
and automaticity, on the other. At the moment, the drive for
certainty and automaticity seems paramount, but not without
criticism and reaction. Much of this drive for certainty rests not
so much on the concept of fair warning, which is inherent in any
idea of the rule of law, but rather more on the belief that new and
automatic applications of the laws will catch objectionable conduct
and effects in their incipiency. The idea of incipiency seems to
rest on economic doctrines, or, conclusions drawn from experience.
Because of these doctrines or conclusions, certain types of conduct
are deemed harmful in themselves, although the harm in the
particular case may not be visible. Economic theory or experience
thus substitutes for an observed effect.
In no area, of course, is the law self-contained, that is, completely
independent of the teachings of other disciplines or tho assumptions, which may change, of underlying philosophy. The common
law, itself, provides the mechanism for moving from doctrines
outside the law into felt distinctions which make the law. As much
as any field of law, however, and more than most, the antitrust laws
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in their evolution have exhibited an explicit interdependence with
economic and political thought. Many of the cases, of course,
reflect the law's skepticism for economists and economics.- But
the antitrust laws have been greatly influenced by economic doctrine. At times the legal and economic theory have appeared to
be the same. New problems for the antitrust laws are therefore
created if it can be shown that, in terms of present day situations,
much of the reliance on economic doctrine is unjustified. Even if
this can be shown, it is possible, perhaps probable, that the law
will continue on its own, for the law is not economics. The main
lines of the law, then, may remain the same, but the statement of
reasons for the law may change, and this in itself should have an
interstitial effect in the cases. Indeed, there is uncertainty whether
the dominant theme of the antitrust laws is to be the evolution of
laws of fair conduct, which may have nothing whatever to do with
economics, or the evolution of minimal rules protecting competition
or prohibiting monopoly or monopolizing in an economic sense. But
this uncertainty only becomes meaningful as the issues concerning
the underlying economic doctrines are sharpened.
We believe the conclusions of economics do not justify the application of the antitrust laws in many situations in which the laws
are now being applied. We conclude, therefore, that there are new
problems for the antitrust laws, and that the future perhaps will
be occupied, at least in part, with their resolution. The new problems for the antitrust laws have to do with size, the concept of
abuse, and with the application of the idea of collusion. They exist,
therefore, in the central field of antitrust enforcement.
The problems are new. The earlier history of the Sherman Act
involved its enforcement against units of great relative size which
had acquired that position largely through mergers and acquisitions and which, in most cases, had engaged in conduct which was
characterized as abusive. Under this analysis, there were three
elements combined in the cases. First, there was great relative
size. Since the relative size which was reached, although not
always maintained, was sufficiently great, the firm could be characterized with some assurance as a monopoly, and its behavior in
an important respect could be predicted. Second, this size was
obtained through acquisitions. Great importance could be attached
to this method of growth. A perennial fear in the application of
the Sherman Act is that it will cut down units which have grown to
great size only because of the economies of large scale, that is, in
response to the demands for efficiency. But during this earlier
1. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 448 (1920). Cf.
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 715 (1948).
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period, the means of growth used by monopolies in many industries

were mergers or acquisitions. It could be argued, although not without some doubt, that, presumptively, growth because of the economies of large scale would not take the form of merger or acquisition in so many industries. The underlying rationale behind this
presumption is that it would strain credulity to believe that in so
many industries the ideal arrangement for one firm would be
merely the collection into one ownership unit of factories which
were originally justified as parts of separate firms. In the reasoning
of the law, the method of growth through mergers or combination
thus could be used as some evidence of intention to monopolize, and
as an answer to the efficiency argument. Third, there was present
also conduct frequently described as abusive. There were instances
of price cutting, exclusive arrangements or tying clauses, the
receipt of rebates, and full line forcing. Perhaps this conduct was
important because it colored the origin of the monopoly. Perhaps
it was important because it characterized the way the monopoly
was used. But since the abuses accompanied great relative size
acquired through combination, no really separate decision had to
be made as to whether it was these abuses which caused illegality.
The abuses might have been merely incidental features of monopolies which were illegal because they had arrived at such size
without the justification of efficiency.
The old Standard Oil case reflects this union of size, combination, and abuses. It was the "unification of power and control
over petroleum and its products which was the inevitable result
of the combining in the New Jersey corporation . . . aggregating
so vast a capital" which gave rise "in the absence of countervailing circumstances, to say the least, to the prima,facie presumption
of intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry..
"2 And this presumption was then made conclusive
by considering conduct and results. This analysis left unanswered
the question of the importance of the abuses in determining illegality. Specifically, it was not settled whether given sufficient size
acquired through combination, an injury through abuses of that
power would have to be shown to spell out a violation of the Sherman Act. As Judge Hand wrote in the Corn Products case, "perhaps it is yet an open question whether or not the test is to be found
only in the combination of enough producing capacity to control
supply and fix prices, or whether it must be shown that the combination had injured the public in the exercise of that power." 3
2. Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911).
3. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1011 (S.D.N.Y.
1916). "If, however, it shall be eventually decided that it is the exercise of the
power... and not the power alone, which is illegal, the case at bar is in the end no
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But the combination of factors made it unnecessary to decide this
question in Corn Products. There was also an open question as to
the status of power less than monopoly but acquired through past
abuses. This was the question which might have been reached in
the United States Steel Corporationcase, 4 if past abuses had been
found. But the Steel Corporation case, itself, marks a turning
point. It is the beginning of the modern period for the Sherman
Act when, with few exceptions, industrial combines are not
monopolies. Some of the firms indeed might have been monopolies
in the past, but there was little likelihood for most of them that
such large relative size would be acquired again.
Today the industrial pattern is far different than it was at the
beginning of the century. It is much less common than it was to
have an industry in which one firm has seventy or more percent
control over productive capacity or sales. There are likely to be at
least three or four units of considerable relative size in an industry.
The absolute size of these firms may be much greater than that
once possessed by any single dominating firm. And large absolute
size, of course, carries with it a power of its own. But it confuses
concepts to call this monopoly power. And there is an additional
change. The role of combination appears to be different. Whatever
the ultimate conclusion may be, it has not yet been shown that
such industrial concentration as exists is due in any widespread
way to recent mergers or acquisitions. And this cannot be shown,
of course, merely by counting the number of mergers or acquisitions
which occur annually. The application of the antitrust laws to
firms of less than monopoly size or to firms which acquired their
size without combination presents new problems for the antitrust
laws.
The Aluminum Co. case 5 hits one of these problems head on. The
big step taken in Alcoa was to find illegality, perhaps without
abuses, but in any event without recent combination. This finding
of monopolizing without combination raises a serious question as
to the application of the antitrust laws to monopolies born solely
out of efficiency. The presence of combinations in the older cases
was supposed to provide the necessary presumption that the growth
in the form taken was not due to the drive towards efficiency and
appropriate scale. Mergers thus appeared to minimize the point
raised in Alcoa that monopoly may "have been thrust upon" the
firm, and thus to satisfy, as Judge Hand indicates, the older cases
different. Under that theory the injuries to the public are shown by the means which
the combination has employed in its efforts either to gain or to maintain its position."
Id. at 1012.
4. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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on the question of "natural" or "normal" conduct, or on the question of intent. 6 Absent combination and abuses, it is possible to
decide, as Alcoa appears to do, that monopoly as such is illegal as
monopolizing. This means that the law has decided that monopoly
behavior is not dependent on the circumstances which gave rise to
the monopoly, and that perhaps even with access to an industry
open, and without collusion, monopoly is not sufficiently self correcting. If stated without qualification, this would mean that a
firm which grew to monopoly size because of the economies of
large scale nevertheless would be illegal. The consequences of the
law would be a less efficient system of production. This would not
necessarily be a decisive criticism of the law, for, as Hand tells us,
the Sherman Act has other objectives. The Congress which passed
the statute, he reminds us, "was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social
or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in
which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction
of a few. ' 7 And this maintenance of an organization of industry
in small units was to be "in spite of possible cost."' 8 Yet despite
this language, the Alcoa opinion attempts to carve out a place for
the argument of efficiency as a defense.
The Alcoa position on efficiency as a defense is somewhat complicated. The "successful competitor," we are told, "having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins." 9 The
opinion draws a distinction between monopoly which has been
"achieved" and monopoly which has been "thrust upon" the firm.' 0
Persons "may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically, so to say; that is without having intended either
to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition
from arising when none had existed; they may become monopolists
by force of accident."" Three illustrations are given:
A market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible,
to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a
plant large enough to supply the whole demand. Or there may
be changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A single producer may be the survivor out of a group
of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill,
foresight and industry.
The language appears to give full consideration to the require6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 429.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 429-30.
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ments of efficiency. But there is balancing language on the other
side. The issue for Alcoa is posed in this fashion: "The only
question is whether it falls within the exception established in
favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the control of a
market."' 12 On this issue, Judge Hand writes:
It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply
them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling
its capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it
never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with
new capacity already geared into a great organization, having
the advantage of experience, trade connection and the elite of
personnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited
to maneuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a
desire to prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably
pursued be deemed not 'exclusionary.'
Perhaps, then the successful competitor can be turned upon
when he wins, because he has been told not to compete.
Judge Wyzanski, in his opinion in the United Shoe Machinery
case, describes the doctrine announced by Judge Hand in Alcoa
as determining that "one who has acquired an overwhelming share
of the market 'monopolizes' whenever he does business ... apparently even if there is no showing that his business involves any
exclusionary practice.' 3 "But," Judge Wyzanski's opinion continues, "it will also be recalled that this doctrine is softened by
Judge Hand's suggestion that the defendant may escape statutory
liability if it bears the burden of proving that it owes its monopoly
solely to superior skill, superior products, natural advantages (including accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or
technological efficiency (including scientific research), low margins
of profit maintained permanently and without discrimination, or
licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of law (including patents on one's own inventions, or franchises granted directly
to the enterprise by a public authority)." Perhaps, then, so far
as efficiency is concerned, Alcoa only shifts the burden to the firm
to justify its growth. It seems clear that Alcoa, in any event, has
not settled the question of the weight to be given to the requirements of efficiency. In the enforcement of a regulatory statute,
this issue might be less troublesome, but it is different for a statute
intended to remove restraints to enterprise as a means of fostering
competition. For the artificial limitation on the growth of a firm
12. Id. at 431.
13. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.

1953).
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is of as much concern as the artificial growth through combination
in order to monopolize. This is a major unsolved problem in the
field of antitrust.
Whatever difficulties the doctrine of Alcoa may have with the
application of the law to growth because of efficiency, the case,
since it deals with undoubted monopoly size, has a strong underlying basis for its assumption that this size carries with it the power
to fix prices. In the case of the assured monopoly, one may predict
a restriction on production because this restriction will be sensible
from the standpoint of the firm. To be sure, even then the firm will
wish to take into account problems of good will and the threat of
governmental intervention. This restriction on production may
provide adequate justification for a law which carries the burden
of limiting economic expansion. But the application of the monopolizing concept of the law to units of lesser relative size raises
special difficulties. For with units of lesser relative size, it cannot be said that there will be inevitably a restriction in production.
If it is granted that there will be more competition if additional
units are fashioned in the industry, this may not be an adequate
basis to justify the application of the law. This is particularly true
in terms of both the state of economics and of the history of the
Sherman Act. For the Sherman Act, as has often been said, is
directed against restraints and monopoly or monopolizing. It was
not intended to compel all possible competition. The act arose out
of an antipathy towards monopoly, and those restraints which were
thought to have the consequences of monopoly. And it is in the
identification and the prediction of the consequences of monopoly
that economics has the most to contribute. There is much greater
uncertainty about the consequences of imperfect competition. The
application of the monopoly concept to industries with three or four
large units leads to curious anomalies. Thus what is deemed adequate relief for one industry, as, for example, the three firms in
aluminum,14 may be the starting point for bringing a case against
another industry, such as tobacco. 15 It is in connection, with the
application of the antitrust laws to firms of less than clear monopoly
size, that the concepts of collusion and abuses have been expanded.
Perhaps it can be said that what is emerging is a law limiting
the uses of size. As Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in Northern Securities, "it has occurred to me that it might be that when a
combination reached a certain size it might have attributed to it
more of the character of a monopoly merely by virtue of its size
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).

15. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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than would be attributed to a smaller one."'16 But since the units
themselves do not have that position which would justify condemning them as monopolies, instead the law has developed to prohibit
for them certain types of conduct deemed collusive or abusive.
Thus without a finding of monopoly, collaborative efforts accompanied by the exclusion of others for competitive reasons are
deemed unlawful in the Associated Press case ;17 vertical integration becomes unlawful in the motion picture industry, 18 although
vertical integration per se is not illegal; tying arrangements are
found illegal when based upon what is called a monopoly or dominant position, although the position in itself may be deemed lawful.19 This places the concepts of collusion and abuses in a new
light.
The concept of abuses is illustrated in Justice Douglas' opinion
in United States v. Grffith. 20 The Griffith case is one of a sequence
of antitrust cases dealing with the motion picture industry. In
Griffith, affiliated exhibitors used a common agent or agents to
negotiate with distributors. The exhibitors therefore "were concededly using their circuit buying power to obtain films." Moreover, "their closed towns were linked with their competitive
towns." These practices apparently were decisive in finding a
conspiracy in violation of both section one and section two of the
Sherman Act. Justice Douglas explains that "anyone who owns and
operates the single theatre in a town, or who acquires the exclusive
right to exhibit a film, has a monopoly in the popular sense,"
although it is not necessarily illegal. Then, "if he uses that strategic
position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as a trade weapon
against his competitors. It may be a feeble, ineffective weapon
where he has only one closed or monopoly town. But as those towns
increase in number throughout a region, his monopoly power in
them may be used with crushing effect on competitors in other
places.... When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to
negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is
using monopoly power to expand his empire." This is "a misuse
of monopoly power under the Sherman Act. If monopoly power
can be used to beget monopoly, the Act becomes a feeble instrument indeed." There could be no doubt that the monopoly power
16. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.197, 407 (1904) (dissenting
opinion).
17. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
19. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
20. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).

HeinOnline -- 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 288 1956-1957

1956]

TRADE REGULATION

of the circuit "had some effect on their competitors and on the
growth" of the circuit. 21
The doctrine of abuses sees them as exclusionary devices useful
for getting a monopoly, or expanding it, or for moving from one
monopoly to the creation of another. Thus when vertical integration is concerned, the inquiry is often as to the "leverage" of the
device. When a tying clause is annexed to a patent, the courts regard this as an attempt to expand the scope of the patent, or as an
attempt to create a new monopoly using the leverage of the patent
monopoly. So in the Grifflth case, buying power which joins the
competitive with the closed towns, is a use of monopoly power to
beget monopoly. It is natural that as the antitrust laws are applied
to firms with less than assured monopoly size, new emphasis should
be placed upon these exclusionary devices or abuses. Since the
firms have not achieved positions which are regarded as illegal in
themselves, it becomes important to see if their conduct threatens
to bring to them greater monopoly power. The rule of Griffith,
then, in contrast to Alcoa which dealt with assured monopoly size,
emphasizes these exclusionary practices which are viewed as the
means of achieving greater monopoly power and therefore as an
illicit use of the power already possessed.2 2 New importance therefore must be attached to the concept of abuses. In addition, the
history of related legislation since the Sherman Act is to give
independent status to these abuses. The abuses represent conduct
which is thought to create monopoly and these are the practices to
be caught under the Robinson-Patman Act, under section three and,
to some extent, seven of the Clayton Act, and under section five
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The practices are to be
caught in order to prevent monopoly in its incipiency.
We are not sure of the basis or the justification for the concept of
abuses. Insofar as the practices involved are covered in special
legislation, perhaps it may be suggested that all that is involved is
a legislative determination that the conduct should be banned.
These enactments have introduced a certain automaticity into the
law; to some extent they preclude or make unnecessary separate
inquiry in each. of the cases as to the effects, advantages, or disadvantages of the banned practices. But even so the enactments
must be supposed to rest upon conclusions drawn from experience
and supportable in general, even though they may not be true of
an exceptional case. Moreover the interrelationship between the
Sherman Act and the amendatory acts suggests that no one of the
21. Id. at 107-08, 109.
22. See Judge Wyzanski's discussion of the Griflith case in United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953).
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special statutes is completely insulated from a pervasive concern
with the doctrines of economics in the field of competition and
monopoly. Indeed the attempt to apply the legislative standard
with strictness has provoked criticism. The report of the Attorney
General's Committee on section three of the Clayton Act, relating
to exclusive dealing, for example, seems to prefer "full factual
analysis of significant market data, ' 23 and here as elsewhere it
appears to favor incorporation of advances in economic teaching
into the case law.24 We may conclude that to an undefined extent
it is of interest to the law to know whether the abuses in fact do
create monopoly.
The economic teaching gives little support to the idea that the
abuses create or extend monopoly. Firms that are competitive
cannot impose coercive restrictions on their suppliers or their
customers as a means of obtaining a monopoly. They lack the
power to do this effectively. Firms which have some monopoly
power over prices and output can impose coercive restrictions on
suppliers and customers. In the normal case, however, they will
lose revenue if they do impose such restrictions, and this casts
some doubt on how prevalent or continued the practice would be.
Such firms would lose revenue because they cannot both obtain the
advantage of the original power and impose additional coercive
restrictions so as to increase their monopoly power. The coercive
restrictions on customers are possible only if the price which would
be charged without the restriction is reduced. The restrictions
therefore would not be sensible except as a means of price discrimination. If used as a means of price discrimination, the restrictions
might be considered more an enjoyment of the original power
than an extension of it. In point of fact even a firm with complete monopoly power over prices and output cannot both get the
advantage of such power and impose additional coercive restrictions on suppliers and customers. At most such a firm, and of
course one with only some monopoly power, can decide to impose
additional costs upon itself for the sake of a restriction. Such a
restriction might be valuable if the effect of it would be to impose
greater costs on possible competitors. But except for this special
case, there is no clearly apparent advantage to a firm with monopoly power as against one without such power.
We realize that it is sometimes said that the restrictive practices
23. REPORT OF THE ArrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 143 (1955). The phrase is used in describing the Commission's
handling of Anchor Serum Co., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5965 (Feb. 16, 1954), aff'd, 217
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954), and Harley-Davidson Motor Co., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5698
(July 7, 1954).
24. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS

132 (1955).
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support or extend monopolies because they can impose large capital
requirements on existing or potential competitors. But this argument seems to require clarification and study. It is not evident
whether the argument is based on an imperfection in the capital
market, on the reluctance to assume the consequent risks, on the
economies associated with raising large amounts of capital, or on
the less efficient scale imposed on rival firms.
To a certain extent the economic analysis of the effect of the
abuses may be relevant only to an interpretation of the meaning
of the language of the law. We have suggested that in most instances the supposed abuses neither support nor enlarge monopoly
power. Yet we realize that in the typical patent tying clause case,
for example, the courts speak of the device as an attempt to expand
the patent monopoly. In the Carbice case,2 5 for example, where
the patent was "for a particular kind of package employing solid
carbon dioxide in a new combination," but not on the package nor
on the dry-ice, the use of the patented combination was tied to the
purchase of dry-ice. Justice Brandeis stated that "relief is denied
because the Dry Ice Corporation is attempting, without sanction
of law, to employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the invention." This was beyond the "scope of the patentee's monopoly." In the Mercoid
case,2 6 the use of a combination patent on a heating system was
tied to the purchase of stoker switches used in the combination.
Justice Douglas stated that the case was "a graphic illustration of
the evils of an expansion of the patent monopoly by private engagements." The practice in both of these cases could be described as
an administrative device for collecting revenue from patents
assumed to be valid.
The Carbice and Mercoid cases are perhaps exceptional in the
tying clause field because they involve combination patents. The
usual reference in this area would be to the practices as portrayed
28
and
in the Dick,27 Internationa Business Machines Corporation,
29
In the
the block booking portions of the motion picture cases.
Dick case the use of the mimeograph machine was tied to the purchase of the supplies for it. The restriction was impliedly upheld,
but Chief Justice White in dissenting wrote, "I have already indicated how, since the decision in the Button Fastener Case, the attempt to increase the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent
25. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 30, 33

(1931).
26.
27.
28.
29.

MIercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1911).
International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
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has become common by resorting to the devices of license restrictions manifested in various forms, all of which tend to increase
monopoly and to burden the public in the exercise of their common
rights. My mind cannot shake off the dread of the vast extension
of such practices which must come from the decision of the court
now rendered. ' 30 In the International Business Machines case,
the use of the machines was tied to the cards utilized with it. Justice Stone characterized the effect of the condition as one "whose
substantial benefit to the lessor is the elimination of business competition and the creation of monopoly. . .. -"3 Block booking is
described in the Paramount case as the "practice of licensing, or
offering for license, one feature or group of features on condition
that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of
features released by the distributors during a given period."3 2 The
result was said "to add to the monopoly of the copyright in violation
of the principle of the patent cases involving tying clauses." Nevertheless, we believe that the practices in each of the three cases can
be explained best as methods of charging different prices to
different customers and not as extensions of monopoly to other
areas.
There are three remaining types of restrictive practices to which
reference is frequently made. They are: (1) joint buying power
linking open and closed situations as in the Grifflth case; (2) exclusive arrangements as in the Standard Fashion33 or Standard
Oil of Californiacases ;34 and, (3) vertical integration. The joint
buying power arrangement assumed to exist in Griffith includes
within that power the strength of the monopoly of the theatres in
the closed towns. This monopoly by itself is assumed to be lawful.
If it is a monopoly, the owner will be enabled to obtain better prices
from the suppliers than could be obtained by each of several independent exhibitors in that market. As we have suggested, it would
seem that in order to impose additional coercive restrictions on the
suppliers, as, for example, on the supplies for competitive markets,
the monopoly owner would have to pay the suppliers for these
additional restrictions. Nor would it seem to be in the interest of
the suppliers to encourage the growth of monopoly among the
exhibitors. Perhaps it could be argued and shown that the
monopoly of the theatres confers larger resources upon the owner,
but otherwise the monopolist has no obvious advantage for competitive areas over any other competitor who sets out to establish
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912).

298 U.S.
334 U.S.
Standard
Standard

131, 140 (1936).
131, 156, 158 (1948).
Fashion Co. v. Magrabe-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
Oil of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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a monopoly. It would seem therefore that the method of buying
supplies for a monopoly and a competitive market through a single
source cannot be assumed to be effective as a means for extending
a monopoly without additional evidence. There is no necessary
effect on competitors. The case is not necessarily different from
where the single source buys for many competitive theatres.
In the exclusive arrangement cases, the firm which is assumed
to have some monopoly power imposes a cost upon itself in order
to obtain the restriction forbidding its customer from handling the
goods of others. There is an obvious monopoly problem if control
over all the possible outlets were thus obtained, but most of the
cases do not involve such control, nor would it be clear that a firm
with a monopoly over the supply would wish to obtain a monopoly
over the outlets. Its monopoly over the supplies is not increased
through its monopoly over the outlets, unless it can be said that
the restrictions on the outlets impose greater costs on potential
competitors than they do on the monopoly company itself. This
may have been the situation in the Standard Fashion case. There
a firm with widespread control over a variety of patterns for
garments entered into exclusive arrangements with a multitude
of outlets. A competitor with less control over the variety of patterns might, through this arrangement, have a greater cost imposed upon it to secure outlets. The reason for this is that there
may well be economies for an outlet in handling a variety of patterns. But the Standard Oil of California case seems less justified
on this basis. In that case no one firm had such a dominion over
the products, and a single outlet handling the gasoline of a competitor would appear to have the same economies open to it as
were open to Standard's stations. The vertical integration cases
appear similar to the exclusive arrangement situations. Vertical
integration, however, often appears explainable as a method of
price discrimination. It will be said that vertical integration like
exclusive arrangements and tying clauses increases a competitor's
capital requirements, and so places him at a disadvantage. We
have already indicated our belief in the need for further exploration
and clarification of that line of argument.
If, then, there is doubt as to the economic support for the conclusions of law with respect to the effect of abuses, this does not
mean that the law will change. When the courts speak of expanding
a monopoly, or of attempting to secure a monopoly through various
exclusionary means, the language used may point to matters about
which economics has little to say. For example, the scope of the
monopoly conferred by a patent is a matter of law. Perhaps a combination patent cannot be enjoyed if the only means of collecting
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for its use is through the sale of one of the parts. Perhaps, also,
the enjoyment of a patent is to be cut short to prevent price discrimination through the use of a tying device. Having conferred
a monopoly in one area, the courts may feel that the incidents of
that monopoly must be confined. Thus a restriction imposed on the
use of products with a patented machine would have an effect upon
the producers of the products. Moreover, even if the restriction
does not bring a new monopoly into existence, it can be regarded as
a restraint. The important point, however, is that the restrictions
or abuses will not in most cases carry with them the normal incidents of monopoly. They will not in the normal case carry with
them any decrease in production, nor, except for price discrimination, any increase in revenue, nor any increase in price. They may
in fact, in some cases of price discrimination, result in an increase
in production. In the language of the Robinson-Patman Act and of
the Clayton Act, the abuses do not in most cases either tend to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. If this
were agreed upon, the law might not change, but its objectives
would be clarified. The law would be seen as having less to do
with competition and monopoly and more to do with merely a set
of rules of fair conduct, perhaps emphasizing the protection of
smaller firms. Clarification of the economic basis thus presents
the opportunity of choice for the law.
The problem of collusion has always been central to the antitrust laws. Price-fixing agreements operate to affect the market
price when they result in restriction in output which affect the
market supply. It is difficult to provide an economic basis for a
law against price-fixing agreements when the market price is
unaffected. Moreover, price-fixing agreements, when adherence to
them cannot be compelled through coercion or penalties, might be
self-correcting either through the defection of members, which
would be rewarding to the individual firm, or through the advent
of new firms. But if a price-fixing agreement occurs between members of an industry controlling a substantial share of the market,
then, when seen as in reality an agreement to control output, the
consequences of this behavior may be predicted with some certainty. It becomes unnecessary to examine the consequences in the
individual case in order to determine whether the resulting prices
are different than competitive. Adopting the standard of competition, it becomes unnecessary to embark on what Judge Taft called
a sea of doubt where reasonableness of the prices is in issue.3 5
Accordingly, there is an economic foundation for the illegality of
35. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 284 (6th Cir.
1898).
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price fixing in itself when market price is affected. There is less
foundation when it cannot be shown that the members of the
arrangement control a substantial share of the market. And
despite the repetition of the slogan that price fixing is illegal per
se, the cases as yet do not hold, save possibly for resale price
control, that price-fixing agreements without power to affect
the market price are illegal.3 6 The clarification which economics
can contribute at this point is to emphasize the importance of
examining the effect of the agreement on production and the market
supply. Yet surely the law may conclude on its own that if the
participants believe the agreement to be worthwhile for them,
then there is sufficient likelihood market supply is affected so that
a general prohibition is justified. The extension of the Sherman
Act into the remoter nooks and crannies of commerce, because of
the broadened view of commerce among the states, however, may
be thought to raise some question as to the worthwhileness of a
prohibition of all forms of price fixing regardless of market effect.
But the serious problem of collusion is to determine what conduct is to be characterized as the equivalent of an agreement to
control output.3 7 A facet of this problem concerns allowable trade
association activities and the proper scope to be permitted to the
uses of knowledge. The relative merits of knowledge and ignorance
are not well defined in legal or economic doctrine. The counterpart of efficient scale in the size problem is the improvement of the
market where collusion is concerned. Behavior designed to achieve
these improvements cannot be readily isolated from behavior
which can be interpreted as characterizing monopoly or effective
agreements to control output. For example, dissemination of real
or assumed knowledge as to pending market changes can bring
about a restriction in output in the industry. The magnitude of the
36. The opinion in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
whittles away at the notion that a price-fixing agreement is illegal only if the group
in it has the power to affect the market price. In the famous footnote 59 of that
opinion Justice Douglas reminds us that "a person 'may be guilty of conspiring,
although incapable of committing the objective offense'." The thrust of footnote
59 is not entirely clear, for in part it reads as though control of the market price,
which is not required, were being distinguished from an influence upon it of advantage to the members of the combination. In this respect the footnote echoes the
language of the body of the opinion that it was immaterial "that other factors also
may have contributed to that rise and stability of the markets." Id. at 219. We
have Judge Hand's interpretation of the footnote to the effect that the plan would
be unlawful "even if the parties did not have the power to fix prices, provided that
they intended to do so." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 432 (1945). But footnote 59 is dictum, for in the actual case "proof that prices
in the Mid-Western area were raised as a result of the activities of the combination
was essential . . . in order to establish jurisdiction in the Western District of
Wisconsin." 310 U.S. 150 at 224.
37. As, for example, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Theatre Enterprises, Inc.
v. Paramount Film Distributing Co., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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change for the individual firm, however, must be based on a prediction by that firm of the behavior of other firms in the industry.
It would appear to be extremely difficult and unwise for the law to
assume that action taken on general knowledge implies a concert
of action equivalent to collusion, conspiracy or agreement, and yet
the result may be the same as that which follows from an agreement. It seems unworkable to suggest that illegality in such cases
should be reserved for those instances where the restriction in individual output goes beyond the point justified by a common reaction and reaches that further restriction of output characteristic
of a monopoly. This problem concerns also the application of the
law to industries with several large firms when the attempt is
made to deal with them as jointly monopolizing because of common patterns of behavior. Here it cannot be said that economic
doctrine indicates with certainty that there will be collusion among
the firms; it cannot be said that there will be inevitably a restriction in production.
The central problems in the field of antitrust as yet unsettled
and pressing for solution concern size, abuses and collusion. We
do not mean to suggest that there are simple economic or legal
answers. The problems are difficult, and the law is not likely to
meet them directly. Nor do we mean to suggest that the law must
of necessity conform to the prescriptions of economic theory, let
alone move within the confines of changing fashions in such theory.
The law indeed can have a life of its own. But in this field of law
more than any other, the general presumptions are of such a character that they cannot be readily isolated from the corresponding
presumptions which dominate economic theory. We do suggest that in the future there may well be a recognition of the instability of the assumed foundation for some major antitrust doctrines. And this may lead to a re-evaluation of the scope and function of the antitrust laws.
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